The Question of Applicability: EU Law or International Law in Nord Stream 2 by Gragl, P
review of central and east european law  
44 (2019) 117-147
<UN>
brill.com/rela
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/15730352-04402001
The Question of Applicability: EU Law  
or International Law in Nord Stream 2
Paul Gragl1
Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London,  
United Kingdom 
p.gragl@qmul.ac.uk
Abstract
Seeing that a bilateral agreement between the EU and Russia on the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline project is highly unlikely to be concluded due to political considerations, this 
paper enquires which existing legal regime is applicable to the governing of this pipe-
line, especially in order to guarantee solidarity and security within the EU energy mar-
ket through third-party access and unbundling requirements. The question is whether 
EU law in general (which the Council denies) or international law applies, and if the 
latter, which specific regime(s): the Energy Charter Treaty, wto law, the law of the sea, 
or a combination of regimes? Lastly, this paper also investigates whether and to what 
extent these international law regimes might guarantee the same solidarity and energy 
security standards as EU law.
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1 Introduction
The Nord Stream 2 project, currently being built by the Russian government-
owned Gazprom along with a consortium of European energy companies, is 
designed to transport natural gas directly from Russia to Germany – and there-
by the European Union (EU) – under the Baltic Sea. This project promises not 
1 Priv-Doz. MMag Dr Paul Gragl, Reader in Public International Law and Theory.
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only to increase the transit of natural gas from Russia to the EU by doubling 
the capacity of the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline, but also to strengthen 
 Germany’s role as a regional gas transit and hub.2 Concurrently, by circum-
venting any other transit countries, such as Ukraine, political disputes with 
these countries that could potentially impact upon transit reliability, can also 
be avoided. Nonetheless, Nord Stream 2 remains one of the most controversial 
projects in EU energy policy. Moreover, due to its geopolitical and legal effects,3 
its promising benefits could eventually turn out to be a toxic gift. In particular 
Poland and the Baltic States, but also the United States, are resisting the con-
struction of this gas pipeline, as it will allow Russia to bypass traditional transit 
countries and thus to attempt to exert political influence on them by threat-
ening their gas supply without affecting supplies to Western Europe.4 This 
prospect of Russia utilizing its gas supply as a ‘weapon’5 sheds a completely 
different light on the Nord Stream 2 project and its potential to detrimentally 
affect the EU’s declared long-term strategy to diversify its gas suppliers, as be-
ing solely dependent on Russian gas cannot be in the EU’s interest. Accord-
ingly, it remains doubtful whether Nord Stream 2 is, as its backers insist, merely 
‘business pure and simple’.6
As a lawyer, it is not my intention to further engage with these (geo-)politi-
cal questions here, especially bearing in mind my lack of training in political 
science. My plan is rather to examine the question ‘what is the law, pure and 
simple’, applicable to the Nord Stream 2 project, and why? Yet at the same time, 
this endeavor presents itself as extremely intricate right from the outset, as 
energy law is inextricably linked to energy policy,7 and it thus seems that law 
and politics cannot be neatly separated here (if that is even possible at all in 
any other context either). This is also true for the divergent views of the  project 
2 Harald Hecking, Simon Schulte, Adnan Vatansever, and Slawomir Raszewski, “Final Report: 
Options for Gas Supply Diversification for the EU and Germany in the Next Two Decades”, 
Report by the ewi Energy Research & Scenarios GmbH and the European Centre for Energy 
and Resource Security (eucers), October 2016, 49.
3 Slawomir Raszewski, “Russian Energy Projects and the Global Climate, Geopolitics, and De-
velopment Conundrum”, in Rafael Leal-Arcas and Jan Wouters (eds.), Research Handbook on 
EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017) 229.
4 Oleg Nikiforov and Gunter-E Hackemesser, “Nord Stream”, in Oleg Nikiforov and Gunter-E 
Hackemesser (eds.), Die Schlacht um Europas Gasmarkt (Springer, Wiesbaden, 2018) 226–227.
5 Ruven Fleming, “A Legal Perspective on Gas Solidarity”, 124(1) Energy Policy (2019), 102–110, at 
102.
6 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Threat to Russia and the West (2nd ed.; Bloomsbury, 
London, 2014) 218.
7 Kim Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account (oup, Oxford, 2013) 6.
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within the EU itself and among the Member States, first and foremost due 
to EU energy policy being a shared competence between the Union and the 
Member States,8 thereby giving rise to enduring tensions among the Member 
States and between the Member States and the EU institutions.9 Furthermore, 
it is also true that choosing (and subsequently applying) one particular legal 
basis reflects a certain political choice,10 as some legal provisions might be po-
litically more opportune than others.
Having said that, I nevertheless try to examine the question at hand, namely, 
what the relevant law is as well as its applicability, as best as possible from a le-
gal-positivist viewpoint; concurrently, I also accept that the content of the law 
is always shaped by political considerations and thus to be taken addito salis 
grano.11 Seeing that there is no bilateral international agreement between the 
EU and Russia governing the Nord Stream 2 project (and that such an agree-
ment is highly unlikely to be concluded in the present-day political climate), 
again, the questions I attempt to answer in this contribution are: which exist-
ing legal regime is applicable to Nord Stream 2? Is it EU law or international 
law and, if the latter, which specific regime and can this regime also guarantee 
specific aspects that are crucial elements of EU energy law (above all, solidar-
ity, the functioning of the internal energy market, and security of gas supply 
qua unbundling and third-party access)?12 It is this last sub-question, namely 
whether international law can safeguard the same standards as EU law, in case 
it does not apply, which contains the predominant political core question in 
terms of legal applicability. For if a leaked European Commission document 
from 201513 is to be trusted, then Gazprom is quite eager to abuse its dominant 
8 See Arts. 2(2) and 4(2)(i) tfeu.
9 Nicole Herweg, “European Energy Policy”, in Nikolaos Zahariadis and Lauri Buonanno 
(eds.), The Routledge Handbook of European Public Policy (Routledge, Abingdon, 2018) 262.
10 See especially in the context of EU law, Merijn Chamon, “The Dividing Line between Del-
egated and Implementing Acts, Part Two: The Court of Justice Settles the Issue in Com-
mission v Parliament and Council (Visa Reciprocity)”, 52(6) cmlr (2015) 1617–1633, at 
1633; Annegret Engel, The Choice of Legal Basis for Acts of the European Union (Springer, 
Cham, 2018) 94.
11 This is a view which is also in line with a strictly ‘pure’ view of the law; see Hans Kelsen, 
Pure Theory of Law (2nd ed.; University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967) 53; Hans Kelsen, 
General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1945) 438–439.
12 I will further explain and analyze these aspects in section 2.
13 European Commission, “Statement of Objections; Case AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Sup-
plies in Central and Eastern Europe”, undated 2015 draft document, available at <http://
biznesalert.com/leak-ec-knows-gazprom-abuses-there-will-be-no-consequences/>.
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position on the EU gas market to try to segment its internal market along na-
tional borders, so that it could impose unfair pricing. And ultimately, it is the 
above-mentioned essential elements of EU energy law, that is, unbundling and 
third-party access, that could prevent such a segmentation of the Union’s in-
ternal market by Gazprom (and therewith the Russian Federation).
To this end, I discuss, in section 2, first these elements of EU energy law, and 
subsequently whether EU law is applicable to Nord Stream 2 or not. Section 3 
then focuses on the potential applicability of public international law to this 
project, starting with the Energy Charter Treaty, the relevant rules of the World 
Trade Organization (wto), and lastly the law of the sea (which might allow for 
indirect application of EU law).
2 The Applicability of European Union Law
2.1 The Fundamental Principles of European Union Energy Law
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, a specific 
legal basis for the energy sector was established in primary EU law for the 
first time. This legal basis is enshrined in Article 194(1) tfeu which states that 
the Union’s energy policy, in a spirit of solidarity, aims, inter alia, to ensure 
the functioning of the energy market and the security of energy supply in the 
Union. Yet even before the Lisbon Treaty, the still valid Third Gas Directive 
of July 2009, regulating the internal market in natural gas,14 also frequently 
mentions solidarity as a means to safeguard the internal market in natural gas 
(for example, in Article 6) as well as the importance of the internal market 
itself and the security of energy supply. It is therefore evident that these three 
principles – solidarity, a functioning internal energy market, and security of 
supply – constitute the paramount objectives of EU energy law. Nevertheless, 
in the light of Article 194(2) tfeu, which ensures that the measures taken 
 under Article 194 tfeu will not affect the Member States’ rights to choose en-
ergy resources and suppliers, solidarity in the context of energy law has been 
14 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC, OJ L 211/94, 14 August 2009. For an overview of the Third Gas Directive, see eg, 
Nicole Herweg, European Union Policy-Making: The Regulatory Shift in Natural Gas Market 
Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017) 187–228; Katja Yafimava, “Transit: The EU Energy 
Acquis and the Energy Charter Treaty”, in Kim Talus (ed.), Research Handbook on Interna-
tional Energy Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014) 607–611.
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construed as “vague”15 and a mere “political”16 or “interpretative, rather than 
legally binding commitment”.17 Others, conversely, argue that this approach is 
inaccurate,18 and even postulate that solidarity is a real and viable “constitu-
tional principle”19 of Union law.
In this debate, I side with the second approach for two reasons. First, since 
the Lisbon Treaty abounds with explicit references to solidarity (most obvious-
ly in Article 222 tfeu, the ‘solidarity clause’),20 it must have a certain mean-
ing and import in EU law. Indeed, solidarity primarily governs the horizontal 
relationship between the Member States and represents the general political 
maxim that they are to support each other in any form.21 Solidarity is the gen-
eral constitutional basis for the more specified legally binding principle of sin-
cere cooperation in Article 4(3) teu,22 and thus, the first is the logical match to 
the latter, which contributes the legally binding and enforceable rules integrat-
ing the Member States within the Union23 and further developing the internal 
market among them. And second, it stands to reason to construe solidarity as a 
duty of sincere cooperation especially in terms of security of energy supply.24 
The reason for this is that the reference to the solidarity principle in Article 194 
tfeu was included in response to requests made by the Polish government 
pertaining primarily to concerns over the security of gas supply from Russia, 
15 Tomas Maltby, “European Union Energy Policy Integration: A Case of European Commis-
sion Policy Entrepreneurship and Increasing Supranationalism”, 55 Energy Policy (2013), 
435–444, at 440.
16 Marcus Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (oup, Oxford, 2014) 35.
17 Theodore Konstadinides, “Civil Protection in Europe and the Lisbon ‘Solidarity Clause’: A 
Genuine Legal Concept or a Paper Exercise”, Uppsala Faculty of Law Working Paper (2011), 
4–21.
18 See in particular Umut Turksen, EU Energy Relations with Russia: Solidarity and the Rule of 
Law (Routledge, London, 2018) 20.
19 Malcolm Ross and Yuri Borgmann-Prebil, Promoting Solidarity in the European Union 
(oup, Oxford, 2010) 4.
20 Klamert, op.cit. note 16, 36.
21 Ibid., 40.
22 Case 6 & 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ecr 523, para 16.
23 Klamert, op.cit. note 16, 40.
24 See, e.g., Eglė Dagilytė, “Solidarity: A General Principle of EU Law? Two Variations on the 
Solidarity Theme”, in Andrea Biondi, Eglė Dagilytė, and Esin Küçük (eds.), Solidarity in EU 
Law: Legal Principle in the Making (Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, 2018) 68; Christian Cal-
liess, “Article 194 aeuv”, in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds.), euv/aeuv: Kom-
mentar (4th ed.; C.H. Beck, Munich, 2011) para. 6.
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as illustrated in the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine.25 Moreover, the 
principle of solidarity now also features abundantly in the 2017 Regulation on 
the Security of Gas Supply,26 which further underlines its significance in EU 
energy law. Article 13(1) of this Regulation expressly mentions that Member 
States may, in the case of a crisis, request solidarity from other Member States 
in the form of additional gas supply. Despite continuing discretion on the part 
of the Member States in implementing this provision,27 it is nonetheless evi-
dent that solidarity in EU energy law constitutes a clear legal obligation and 
cannot be simply disregarded as a vague political guideline.
2.2 Solidarity in the Third Gas Directive: Unbundling and Third-Party 
Access
As already mentioned above, solidarity in energy law can also be found in sec-
ondary EU law, most importantly in the Third Gas Directive, which slightly 
predates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but which is still in force. The 
general objective of this directive is to consolidate the Union’s internal energy 
market by, inter alia, achieving competitive prices and contributing to security 
of supply in natural gas. To that end, the directive sets out various obligations, 
but for the purposes of this contribution I focus only on the following two cen-
tral aspects: (i) the unbundling requirement and (ii) third-party access; these, 
in my view, best reflect the obligation to solidarity in energy law among the EU 
Member States.
2.2.1 The ‘Unbundling’ Requirement
‘Unbundling’ is a measure for dealing with gas transmission networks as natu-
ral monopolies,28 in which the transmission of energy is not typically carried 
25 Johann-Christian Pielow and Britta Janina Lewendel, “Beyond ‘Lisbon’: EU Competences 
in the Field of Energy Policy”, in Bram Delvaux, Michael Hunt, and Kim Talus (eds.), EU 
Energy Law and Policy Issues (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011), 300.
26 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regula-
tion (EU) No 994/2010, OJ L 280/1, 28 October 2017.
27 Fleming, op.cit. note 5, 109–110.
28 See, e.g., Richard A Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation”, 21(1) Stanford Law 
Review (1969), 548–643; Christopher Decker, Modern Economic Regulation: An Introduc-
tion to Theory and Practice (cup, Cambridge, 2014) 227 and 283; Sergey Kirsanov, Evgeny 
Safonov, and Sandra Ramirez, “Natural Monopoly in Russia: State Regulation Problems”, 
5(1) Baltic Journal of Real Estate Economics and Construction Management (2017), 137–145, 
at 140.
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out on a competitive basis, but by a single natural monopolist.29 Hence, to 
separate the competitive from the non-competitive segment in order to pre-
vent misuse through control of the latter,30 energy transmission activities are 
separated – or unbundled – from energy production or generation on the one 
hand and supply activities on the other.31 The Third Gas Directive provides 
for three types of unbundling, varying in degree and intrusiveness,32 but they 
all pursue the same goal, namely safeguarding the neutrality of system opera-
tors in allocating gas transmission capacities to different network users.33 Ac-
cordingly, unbundling needs to be regarded as an invaluable instrument for 
promoting solidarity by improving competition and thereby the EU’s internal 
energy market as well as the security of gas supply. This interpretation also 
conforms to the Commission’s view that the now abandoned South Stream 
project was in breach of EU competition law because of its failure to provide 
for any unbundling.34 Currently, it seems that Gazprom intends to continue 
as the sole owner of Nord Stream 2 as well as a producer and supplier of gas,35 
which would be in violation of the directive’s unbundling requirement.
2.2.2 The ‘Third-Party Access’ Requirement
The ‘third-party access’ requirement is also an instrument for overcoming mo-
nopolist situations in gas transmission. In this case, however, it is not a natural 
monopoly that prevents fair competition, but a monopoly in infrastructure. As 
29 Tilman Michael Dralle, Ownership Unbundling and Related Measures in the eu Energy 
Sector: Foundations, the Impact of wto Law, and Investment Protection (Springer, Cham, 
2017) 1.
30 Talus, op.cit. note 7, 79.
31 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 2.
32 See Art. 9 of the Directive for ‘ownership unbundling’; Arts. 13–14 for the ‘independent 
system operator’ model of unbundling; and Arts. 17–23 for ‘independent transmission op-
erator’ unbundling. For an excellent overview of these models, see Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 
26–34, and Yafimava, op.cit. note 14, 607–608.
33 European Commission, “Request pursuant to the Framework Agreement – Nord Stream 2”, 
12 September 2017, 2.
34 Commission Decision of 24 May 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) and Article 54 of the eea Agree-
ment; Case AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. See also 
Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, “Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s 
Geostrategy and Its Effects on the EU”, 92(3) International Affairs (2016), 605–627, at 618; 
Rafael Kandiyoti, Powering Europe: Russia, Ukraine, and the Energy Squeeze (Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2015) 69–73.
35 Alan Riley, “Nord Stream 2: A Legal and Policy Analysis”, 151 ceps Special Report (2016), 
1–27, at 10.
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it is economically nonsensical to construct more than one physical gas pipe-
line network for any given project, it follows that all producers and suppliers 
in a market are then dependent on that one network. Gas networks therefore 
have an inbuilt monopoly character that must be regulated; first and foremost 
through third-party access, which obligates pipeline operators to grant market 
competitors access to the gas pipeline in question in a non-discriminatory way 
in order to allow for fair competition and security of supply.36 The Third Gas 
Directive in its Article 32 provides such a legal right for third parties to access 
and use the grid of a gas transmission system owner and thereby guarantees 
the goal of the internal gas market wherein gas can be transported and traded 
freely across Member State borders. Thus, third-party access, in the same way 
as unbundling, must be seen as an instrument for fostering solidarity among 
the Member States in terms of energy competition and security. In the context 
of Nord Stream 2, it needs to be noted at the outset that this requirement con-
flicts with Russian legislation providing Gazprom with an export monopoly on 
gas.37 The Russian Federation could certainly lift this export monopoly legisla-
tion in order to comply fully with EU law. However, that seems unlikely at the 
moment.38
2.2.3 Certifications and Possible Exemptions
In this light, it is crucial also to examine Article 11 of the Third Gas Directive, 
which stipulates that certification for compliance with the unbundling and 
third-party access requirements is to be refused if a transmission system owner 
involved in the process is controlled by persons from a third country that does 
not comply with these two requirements or if granting certification will put 
the security of energy supply to the Union at risk. In academic circles and be-
yond, Article 11 has already colloquially been dubbed the ‘Gazprom clause’. The 
reason for this is that, whilst the provision certainly applies to all third coun-
tries, it has clearly been drafted to apply primarily to the Russian natural gas 
monopoly Gazprom.39 As a consequence, it constitutes a considerable barrier 
for Gazprom to own and operate transmission networks within the EU, seeing 
that it does not comply with the requirements of the Third Gas Directive.40 
36 Talus, op.cit. note 7, 19.
37 Federal Act of the Russian Federation No.117 FZ of 18 July 2006.
38 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 11.
39 Moritz Wüstenberg and Kim Talus, “wto Law Perspectives on EU-Russia Energy Trade: 
Worlds Apart or Minor Differences”, 11(4) Journal of World Energy Law and Business (2018), 
360–371, at 362.
40 Yafimava, op.cit. note 14, 608 n 42.
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But even beyond that, in bypassing the EU Member States of Central and East-
ern Europe, Nord Stream 2 might pose a supply risk to these States. One could 
of course argue that Member States like Germany, having then full access to 
gas supply, could then be requested to show solidarity and guarantee supply 
security via the German pipeline system into these affected States. Yet even if 
 German goodwill can be guaranteed, these States will nonetheless face signifi-
cant extra costs as a result of the transit fees necessary to bring gas via Nord 
Stream 2 and the German pipeline network. Given these risks and the clear 
non-compliance with the requirements of the Third Gas Directive, it is difficult 
to see how Nord Stream 2 can be certified for the purposes of Article 11.41
One solution to circumvent the requirements of EU energy law is to seek 
an exemption for Nord Stream 2 under Article 36 of the Directive. This pro-
vision states that in order to encourage investment in new infrastructure, an 
exemption for a defined period of time from the application of the full rigor of 
the Directive is possible, namely for interconnectors, if this new infrastructure 
enhances competition in gas supply and security of supply (Article 36(1)(a)). 
Accordingly, for that period the requirements of unbundling and third-party 
access would not apply to Nord Stream 2. Prima facie, it seems that the exemp-
tion in Article 36 would not apply, as Article 2(17) of the Directive defines an 
‘interconnector’ as a transmission line crossing or spanning a border between 
Member States for the sole purpose of connecting their national transmis-
sion systems. It is evident that Nord Stream 2 connects pipeline networks be-
tween EU Member States and a non-EU Member State – that is, Russia – which 
would prevent application of Article 36. However, Recital 35 of the Directive 
clearly states that, for security of supply reasons, temporary derogations from 
the strict requirements of the Directive should also apply to new pipelines 
within the Union transporting gas from third countries into the Union. Disre-
garding the editorial mistake in Article 2(17) read in conjunction with Article 
36(1) would then suggest that an exemption under Article 36 is indeed pos-
sible. Nonetheless, the actual application of such an exemption is extremely 
unlikely for three reasons. First, Gazprom has not filed an exemption request 
for Nord Stream 1 or South Stream, so it is improbable that they would do so 
in the case of Nord Stream 2. Second, Gazprom would have great difficulty in 
complying with the strict conditions for an exemption under Article 36(1), as 
Nord Stream 2 would enhance neither competition in gas supply nor security 
of supply. Third and last, if Gazprom filed for an exemption, it would thereby 
have to subject itself to intense regulatory scrutiny by the Commission, which 
41 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 12–13.
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might not be a very appealing prospect.42 Another interesting corollary here 
would be that filing for an exemption would also show that Gazprom accepts 
the applicability of EU law to Nord Stream 2 in the first place, which is a step 
it may attempt to avoid anyway because of the Directive’s strict requirements.
2.3 Legal Opinion of the Commission and Council: Non-Applicability of 
the Third Gas Directive to Nord Stream 2
After this overview of solidarity in EU energy law and its main elements, I now 
return to the main question at hand, namely whether EU law in general and 
the Third Gas Directive in particular are applicable to Nord Stream 2. While it 
is undisputed that the onshore extension of this pipeline system will be sub-
ject to EU law, it is currently unclear whether these same rules will also extend 
to its offshore infrastructure. The decisive issue here is the nature and legal 
definition of the pipeline. The Nord Stream 2 consortium regards the system 
as an import pipeline whose sole function is to transport gas to the border 
of the internal energy market.43 As such (and as already mentioned above), 
Nord Stream 2 would not fall under the rubric of transmission infrastructure 
or interconnector within the meaning of Article 2(17) of the Third Gas Direc-
tive and hence not the scope of this directive. In fact, it would be comparable 
to existing pipelines carrying non-EU gas to Europe,44 such as Green Stream 
(between Libya and Italy), the Maghreb-Europe pipeline (Algeria-Morocco-
Spain), Medgaz (Algeria-Spain), the Transmed Pipeline (Algeria-Tunisia-Italy), 
or Galsi (Algeria-Italy). None of these import pipelines are subject to EU law 
and are therefore required to fulfil unbundling or third-party access require-
ments.45 However, the main difference between these pipelines and Nord 
Stream 2 is that they are not – as Gazprom is – the sole owners as well as pro-
ducers and suppliers of gas.
The problem remains that this legal uncertainty leaves ample room for a 
 politically motivated interpretation of the law. Interestingly, in 2017, both the 
European Commission and the Council of the EU concluded – despite some 
substantive differences – that the offshore elements of Nord Stream 2 would 
not be subject to the Third Gas Directive. The Commission states that neither 
42 Ibid., 13–16.
43 Andreas Goldthau, “Assessing Nord Stream 2: Regulation, Geopolitics & Energy Security 
in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK”, European Centre for Energy and Resource 
Security (eucers) and King’s Russia Institute, 2016, 22.
44 Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, “Russian Gas Transit across Ukraine Post-2019: Pipeline 
Scenarios, Gas Flow Consequences, and Regulatory Constraints”, Oxford Institute for En-
ergy Studies, oies Paper: NG 105, February 2016,
45 Goldthau, op.cit. note 43, 22.
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the EU nor its Member States could claim jurisdiction over the part of an off-
shore pipeline outside their territory, and likewise, no third country could im-
pose application of its national jurisdiction on such offshore pipelines outside 
of its territory. This situation results either in a legal void or in the application 
of two different and perhaps contradictory legal regimes to one and the same 
stretch of pipeline, which is not acceptable either.46 The Council agrees that 
no such jurisdiction could be claimed by either the Union and its Member 
States or a third country, and that consequently EU law cannot be applied, but 
this would not necessarily lead to a legal void, as the offshore parts of the pipe-
line would in any event be subject to the relevant rules of international law, in 
particular the law of the sea.47 In a second legal opinion, the Commission then 
argues that EU law in general would be applicable within the territorial waters 
and the exclusive economic zones of a Member State as well as – insofar as off-
shore pipelines are concerned – between the landing point in a Member State 
and the first connection to the offshore network. However, the general territo-
rial jurisdiction of EU law does not necessarily coincide with the specific scope 
of the respective provisions of secondary EU law. The reason for this is that the 
regulatory framework of the Third Gas Directive, wherein third-party access 
and unbundling should contribute to the opening of the EU gas market, does 
not expressly provide for the application of these rules to an offshore import 
pipeline connecting a Member State with a third country. This absence of such 
specific rules on pipelines from third countries such as Nord Stream 2 indicates 
that the legislator did not intend these rules to apply in those cases, in particu-
lar as application would make them unilaterally binding on third countries48 
and hence have an extraterritorial effect, which would be unjustifiable under 
general international law.49
46 European Commission, “Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the open-
ing of negotiations on an agreement between the European Union and the Russian Feder-
ation on the operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline”, com(2017) 320 final, Doc. 10249/17, 
12 June 2017, 4.
47 Council of the European Union, “Opinion of the Legal Service: Recommendation for a 
Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on an agreement between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation on the operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipe-
line – Allocation of competences and related legal issues”, Doc. 12590/17, 27 September 
2017, 5.
48 European Commission, “Request pursuant to the Framework Agreement – Nord Stream 2”, 
Ares(2017)s4728131, 12 September 2017, 2–3.
49 See, in general, Kim Talus and Moritz Wüstenberg, “Risk of Expanding the Geographical 
Scope of EU Energy Law”, 26(5) European Energy and Environmental Law Review (2017), 
138–147.
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These arguments, coming from the Commission and the Council, show 
that – at least prima facie – EU law is not applicable to Nord Stream 2, and 
they also demonstrate a certain unwillingness on the part of these two bod-
ies to construe Union law as applicable. This situation will endure until the 
Commission’s plan to extend these common EU gas rules to import pipelines 
is effectively implemented.50 Yet until then, this status quo raises the question 
whether Nord Stream 2 might interfere with the EU’s objectives of solidarity, 
the functioning of the energy market, and security of energy supply, if the rules 
of unbundling and third-party access do not apply to this pipeline system.
3 The Applicability of International Law
Assuming that EU law in general and the Third Gas Directive in particular do 
not apply to the offshore parts of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system, it stands 
to reason, as the Council stated in its legal opinion,51 that this pipeline sys-
tem will be governed by international law – although it remains to be seen by 
which specific international legal regime. The most viable candidates are the 
Energy Charter Treaty, the respective rules of the World Trade Organization 
(wto), and the law of the sea. However, one substantial problem remains, and 
that is whether – given the inapplicability of EU law – its requirements of un-
bundling and third-party access could be guaranteed, albeit only indirectly, by 
international law. In the following sections I will therefore investigate whether 
this is the case and if one of these international legal regimes could safeguard 
these requirements in the same way and according to the same standards as 
EU law, starting with the most specific, the Energy Charter Treaty, continuing 
with the subsidiary rules of the wto, and concluding with the general rules of 
the law of the sea.
3.1 The Energy Charter Treaty
The Energy Charter Treaty (ect) entered into force in 1998 and is a unique 
multilateral treaty, as it establishes within the energy sector detailed rights 
and obligations with respect to a broad range of investment, trade, and im-
provement of energy efficiency. As described in its Article 4, the objective is 
to “establish a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in 
50 For further details, see the contribution by Nina Zafoschnig in this issue: Nina  Zafoschnig, 
“The ‘Lex Nord Stream 2’ and its Potential Impact” 44(2) Review of Central and East 
 European Law (2019), 1–14.
51 See Council of the European Union, op.cit. note 47, 5.
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the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits […].”52 This 
spirit of cooperating in the energy sector is perhaps best expressed by another 
purpose of this treaty, which is the most relevant for the purposes of the pres-
ent discussion, namely, common rules for the transit of energy, including a 
transit non-interference clause and a specific transit dispute conciliation pro-
cedure, thereby putting into place an internationally supervised transit regime 
for energy.53 This principle of freedom of transit is enshrined in Article 7 ect, 
which, in paragraph 1, obliges the parties to “take the necessary measures to 
facilitate the transit of energy materials and products consistent with the prin-
ciple of freedom of transit.” This provision is based on Article V of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt),54 although it has been argued that it 
is narrower in scope than this source provision.55 Freedom of transit under 
the ect operates on a non-discriminatory basis in terms of access to pipeline 
networks (Article 7(1)) and rights to construct new transit capacities (Article 
7(2)). Article 7(7) further ensures no interruption or reduction in the flow of 
energy materials and products as well as, in the case of a dispute, a conciliation 
procedure.
Given the importance of secure energy transit across multiple national 
boundaries, negotiations on a Transit Protocol started in 2000, aimed at clari-
fying, complementing, and strengthening Article 7 ect, and accordingly it 
would have been only open to States that had already ratified the ect first.56 
Multilateral negotiations were completed in 2002, while some issues remained 
to be resolved between the EU and Russia on the basis of bilateral negotia-
tions. However, these negotiations were suspended and finally frozen after the 
52 For a comprehensive overview, see, e.g., Craig S. Bamberger, “An Overview of the Energy 
Charter Treaty”, in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gate-
way for Investment and Trade (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996) 1–34; Kaj Hobér, “The Energy 
Charter Treaty: An Overview”, 8(3) Journal of World Investment & Trade (2007), 323–355; 
and Thomas Roe, Matthew Happold, and James Dingemans QC, Settlement of Investor-
State Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty (cup, Cambridge, 2011).
53 Yafimava, op.cit. note 14, 611.
54 See Turksen, op.cit. note 18, 50, and Andrey Konoplyanik, “Russia-EU Summit: wto, the 
Energy Charter Treaty and the Issue of Energy Transit”, (2) International Energy Law and 
Taxation Review [2005], 30–35.
55 See, eg, Yafimava, op.cit. note 14, 612; Martha M. Roggenkamp, “Transit of Network-Bound 
Energy: The European Experience”, in Thomas W. Wälde (ed.), The Energy Charter Treaty: 
An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade (Kluwer, The Hague, 1996) 512.
56 See Andrey Konoplyanik, “Russia-EU, G-8, ect and Transit Protocol”, 4(3) Russian/cis En-
ergy & Mining Law Journal (2006), 9–12.
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 Russian government decided not to become a contracting party to the ect and 
terminated its provisional application in 2009.57
This is exactly the point where a possible application of the ect to Nord 
Stream 2, in order to guarantee the EU requirements of unbundling and third-
party access, becomes extremely problematic for various reasons. To begin 
with, both the ect itself58 and the (draft) Transit Protocol59 emphasize that 
contracting parties are not obliged to introduce mandatory third-party access, 
nor do they mention the unbundling requirement at all.60 Accordingly, in sub-
stance, the ect would not and could not serve the purpose of guaranteeing 
these requirements in the absence of EU law. Second, even though all the EU 
Member States as well as the EU itself are among the contracting parties to the 
ect, the Russian Federation is not. Russia signed the treaty, but never ratified 
it, and – as already mentioned above – only applied it provisionally under its 
Article 4561 until 2009, when it terminated the provisional application62 for 
several reasons.63 This means that even if the ect contained any requirements 
on unbundling and third-party access in the context of Nord Stream 2, Russia 
would – as a mere signatory – not be legally bound by it. Russia’s only obliga-
tion as a signatory is to refrain from any acts which would defeat the object and 
the purpose of the treaty under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (vclt), but again, seeing that both the ect and the draft Transit 
Protocol do not oblige the contracting parties (or signatories, for that matter) 
to introduce mandatory third-party access and unbundling, Russia is in no po-
sition to defeat such a non-existent object and purpose in any case. Third and 
last, one could argue that according to Article 45(3)(b) ect, Russia remains 
bound by the ect’s dispute settlement clauses, most importantly Article 26 on 
57 Yafimava, op.cit. note 14, 612–613; Turksen, op.cit. note 18, 50–51.
58 Understanding 1(b)(i) ect: “The provisions of the Treaty do not oblige any Contracting 
Party to introduce mandatory third party access […].”
59 Preamble, third recital of the Transit Protocol: “Recalling that pursuant to Understand-
ing 1(b) of the Treaty [i.e. the ect], the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol do not 
oblige any Contracting Party to introduce mandatory third party access […].”
60 Talus, op.cit. note 7, 243; Andrey Konoplyanik, “The Role of the ect in EU-Russia Energy 
Relations”, in Rafael Leal-Arcas and Jan Wouters (eds), Research Handbook on EU Energy 
Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017) 133.
61 See William Spiegelberger, “The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Russia: An 
Analysis of the Relevant Treaties, Laws, and Cases”, 16(2) American Review of Internation-
al Arbitration (2005), 261–313, at 271 fn 48; Peter C. Laidlaw, “Provisional Application of 
the Energy Charter as Seen in the Yukos Dispute”, 52(2) Santa Clara Law Review (2012), 
 655–684, at 665–666.
62 Which is possible under Article 45(3) of the ect. See also Turksen, op.cit. note 18, 50.
63 See Turksen, op.cit. note 18, 54–55.
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investor-State disputes, for another twenty years (thus expiring only in 2029), 
which was also proven by the Yukos64 and Hulley65 arbitral awards of 2014 (that 
is, after termination of the ect’s provisional application), in which the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration relied on the ect as the relevant applicable law. 
The problem, however, remains that the ect’s dispute settlement can only be 
used for investments made during the period of provisional application, which 
ended in 2009. This would certainly exclude Nord Stream 2.
This means, in conclusion, that the ect cannot guarantee the same require-
ments as EU law in terms of unbundling and third-party access and is not even 
applicable to Nord Stream 2.
3.2 Relevant wto Rules
Seeing that the leges speciales of the ect regime do not apply to Nord Stream 2, 
it is possible that the relevant rules of the more general wto system might 
govern the unbundling of and third-party access to this pipeline. Both the EU 
itself as well as its Member States in their own right66 and the Russian Federa-
tion67 are members of the wto, which means that the relevant rules would be 
binding on all parties involved. However, the crucial question remains whether 
the wto agreements cover energy goods and services as a distinctive sector,68 
and subsequently, whether the most suitable candidates, namely (i) the gatt 
and (ii) the General Agreement on Trade in Services (gats), can safeguard 
third-party access and unbundling in the context of Nord Stream 2.
3.2.1 Applicability of the gatt
The original gatt did not contain any specific rules related to energy trading, 
which might historically be explained by the underdeveloped state of cross-
border energy trading particularly in grid-linked sales of gas, at the time of the 
gatt negotiations.69 Today, it is nevertheless undisputed that the  fundamental 
64 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v the Russian Federation, pca Case No. AA 227, 18 July 
2014.
65 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v the Russian Federation, pca Case No. AA 226, 18 July 
2014.
66 The EU (or more correctly: its legal predecessor the European Communities) has been a 
wto member since 1 January 1995. For a critical discussion of this parallel membership 
and the weighing of votes, see, eg, Frank Hoffmeister, “Institutional Aspects of Global 
Trade Governance from an EU Perspective” in Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans, and 
Jan Wouters (eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (oup, Oxford, 
2013) 147–148.
67 The Russian Federation acceded to the wto on 22 August 2012.
68 Turksen, op.cit. note 18, 59.
69 Yulia Selivanova, “The wto Agreements and Energy” in Kim Talus (ed.), Research Hand-
book on International Energy Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014) 275.
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principles of the wto, first and foremost the principle of the most-favored 
nation treatment enshrined in Article 1.1 gatt, equally apply to the energy 
sector, thus covering trade in gas.70 Trade in gas squarely falls within the area 
of ‘trade in goods’ regulated by the wto Multilateral Agreements on Trade in 
Goods, listed in Annex 1A to the wto Agreement, including the gatt.71 This 
can be easily argued as natural gas has a physical composition, can be bought 
and sold in the market like any other merchandise, and is transportable via 
pipelines,72 and therefore perfectly fits the definition of a ‘good’ as a “physi-
cal [object] for which a demand exists, over which membership rights can be 
established and whose ownership can be transferred from one institutional 
unit to another by engaging in transactions on markets”.73 Furthermore, in the 
very first dispute decided by the Appellate Body, the US – Gasoline case,74 no 
party contested the regulation of trade in energy and energy products under 
the gatt and other applicable Agreements on Trade in Goods in Annex 1A to 
the wto Agreement.75 As a consequence, the gatt certainly applies to mea-
sures affecting trade in gas as a good, notably its Article v.1 which defines the 
notion of ‘traffic in transit’ as ‘goods’, and hence applies to the traffic of gas in 
transit.76 Furthermore, the first sentence of Article v.2 integrates the principle 
of freedom of transit into the gatt by providing that “[t]here shall be freedom 
of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most 
convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory 
of other contracting parties.”
The application of Article v.2 gatt and freedom of transit, in turn, rais-
es another set of questions, namely: seeing that it does not explicitly men-
tion third-party access and unbundling, does it nonetheless somehow allow 
for them in the context of Nord Stream 2? Concerning third-party access, 
the scholarly literature is characterized by conflicting interpretations. Some 
70 Ibid., 280–289; Talus and Wüstenberg, op.cit. note 49, 144–147.
71 Vitaliy Pogoretskyy, Freedom of Transit and Access to Gas Pipeline Networks under wto 
Law (cup, Cambridge, 2017) 120.
72 See ibid., 120–121. See also Beatriz H. Melgar, The Transit of Goods in Public International 
Law (Brill, Leiden, 2015) 7–10; and Lothar Ehring and Yulia Selivanova, “Energy Transit” in 
Yulia Selivanova (ed.), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: wto, nafta, and 
Energy Charter (Kluwer, Aalphen aan den Rijn, 2011) 57–58.
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), “Glossary of Statisti-
cal Terms”, <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1129> (accessed 3 January 2019).
74 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel and Appel-
late Body Report adopted on 20 May1996, WT/DS2/9.
75 Pogoretskyy, op.cit. note 71, 122.
76 Ibid.
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 scholars regard a right to third-party access as flowing directly from the free-
dom of transit as such77 or construe it as a compulsory right which can be en-
forced even against “private companies, whose conduct is not attributable to 
the State”;78 whilst others, conversely, deny the existence of such a right under 
the gatt altogether.79 As a middle ground between these two extreme posi-
tions, Vitaliy Pogoretskyy suggests that the obligation to provide freedom of 
transit under the first sentence of Article v.2 gatt may solely include ancillary 
rights related to this freedom. There is certainly no positive obligation imposed 
on wto members to construct pipeline facilities in their respective territories 
or to enforce a compulsory third-party access right against a private pipeline 
operator. However, since it is generally recognized that freedom of gas transit 
cannot be effected without access to pipeline infrastructures, an outright re-
fusal of such access would appear to be inconsistent with Article v.2 gatt.80 
This means that if we accept the principle of freedom of transit as a principle 
of general international law,81 then it can only be seen as an ‘imperfect right’, 
because its implementation effectively requires conclusion of an agreement 
between the parties involved in order to guarantee third-party access to the 
77 See, eg, Ehring and Selivanova, op.cit. note 72, 70–71;
78 Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures (oup, Ox-
ford, 2015) 63–67.
79 See, eg, Mireille Cossy, “Energy Trade and wto Rules: Reflexions on Sovereignty over Nat-
ural Resources, Export Restrictions, and Freedom of Transit” in Christoph Herrmann and 
Jörg Philipp Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer, 
Heidelberg, 2012) 298–299; Andrei A Konoplyanik, “Russia-EU Summit: wto, the Energy 
Charter Treaty and the Issue of Energy Transit”, 2(1) International Energy Law and Taxa-
tion Review (2005), 30–35, at 32; Vladimir Rakhmanin, “Transportation and Transit of 
Energy and Multilateral Trade Rules: wto and Energy Charter” in Joost Pauwelyn (ed.), 
Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy, and the Environment (The Graduate 
Institute, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, Geneva, 2010) 124.
80 Pogoretskyy, op.cit. note 71, 146–147.
81 See, eg, Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace; vol 2 (Richard Tuck and Jean Barbeyrac 
(eds.); Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2005) chapter 2, and Samuel von Pufendorf, De jure na-
turae et gentium libri octo; vol 2 (James Brown Scott (ed.); Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934) 
354, for natural law arguments; Elihu Lauterpacht, “Freedom of Transit in International 
Law”, 44 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1958), 313–356, at 319–320, 332–333, 335–338, 
and 346, for necessity and bona fides arguments; Lucius Caflisch, “Land-locked States and 
their Access to and from the Sea”, 49 British Yearbook of International Law (1979), 71–100, 
at 78, and Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability 
of States to Foreign Stakeholders”, 107(2) American Journal of International Law (2013), 
295–333, at 320, 322, and 327, for arguments based on innocent passage and international 
cooperation.
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pipeline in question.82 The result would be an obligation to negotiate such an 
implementation agreement in good faith and a prohibition of abuse of rights, 
and compulsory third-party access rights should thus not be implied lightly in 
Article v.2 gatt.83 Yet again, in the context of Nord Stream 2, another problem 
rears its ugly head, namely the fact that there will most probably be no im-
plementation agreement between the EU and Russia on this pipeline project, 
which would then defeat the actual implementation of these ancillary rights 
in practice. This would mean, in conclusion, that Article v.2 gatt cannot guar-
antee third-party access rights to Nord Stream 2.
The unbundling requirement is not covered by Article v gatt either, as un-
bundling itself is directed against the anti-competitive practice of vertical inte-
gration (wherein the supply of gas is provided for by the owner of the pipeline, 
that is, here: Gazprom) and therefore not an obligation imposed upon wto 
members in order to safeguard freedom of transit. In fact, unbundling policies 
address private conduct that impedes cross-border trade in energy goods and 
services, with discriminatory network access being the main issue here. His-
torically seen, however, it is governmental restraints which have represented 
the most significant limitations on world trade; and consequently, it becomes 
evident that where governmental trade barriers exist and competition is cat-
egorically ruled out, the issue of network access does not arise in the first place. 
Hence, in order for unbundling measures to become actually relevant and ef-
fective, it is necessary to guarantee that there are no governmentally imposed 
barriers to energy trade; only then can unbundling measures play a meaningful 
role and prevent private market actors from impeding market access.84
Within the framework of gatt, Article xvii on ‘State Trading Enterprises’ 
has a certain competition dimension and could therefore be relevant in the 
present discussion. Article xvii.1 gatt in particular obligates wto members 
to ensure that State trading enterprises (that is, State enterprises and enter-
prises with exclusive or special privileges) act – when purchasing or selling 
either imports or exports – “in a manner consistent with the general principles 
of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed [in the gatt] for governmen-
tal measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.” This effectively 
means that wto members cannot, through such State trading enterprises, 
82 Pogoretskyy, op.cit. note 71, 64 and 147.
83 Ibid., 235 and 241.
84 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 273–274.
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 undertake or facilitate conduct that would be considered discriminatory un-
der the gatt if such conduct were directly carried out by the State itself.85
The problem remains – as will be explained in the following paragraphs – 
that Article xvii gatt has only a very limited ability to ensure that vertically in-
tegrated energy undertakings such as Nord Stream 2 are subject to  unbundling 
measures.86 To begin with, it is true that entirely or predominantly State-owned 
or State-controlled companies are automatically covered by this provision,87 
but the same does not apply to private entities, as it is then additionally neces-
sary to demonstrate that “exclusive or special privileges” have been granted.88 
It has been argued that such rights and privileges can be considered exclusive 
or special if they enable the enterprise to influence trade flows;89 and on that 
basis, the mere fact of having control over a transportation network would be 
sufficient to meet the definition of “exclusive or special privileges”.90 Tilmann 
Dralle, however, contends that this interpretation is incorrect, since this abil-
ity to “influence […] the level or direction of imports or exports” mentioned 
in the working definition of State trading enterprises in the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article xvii gatt 1994, was included for notification 
purposes only and is thus ‘without prejudice’ to the substantive obligations 
in Article xvii gatt.91 Furthermore, even under the 1994 Understanding, the 
ability to “influence […] the level or direction of imports or exports” is merely 
a necessary – but not a sufficient – condition to qualify as a State trading en-
terprise, because the grant of exclusive or special privileges is still required. 
Consequently, a vertically integrated energy undertaking that has control over 
a transmission network cannot be considered a State trading enterprise simply 
because its network-related activities affect imports and exports of gas; for that 
85 Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, Report 
of the Appellate Body of 30 August 2004, WT/DS276/AB/R, para 85.
86 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 289.
87 Tania Voon, “Article xvii gatt” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, and Holger P Hes-
termeyer (eds.), wto – Trade in Goods (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011) para 4.
88 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 289.
89 Yulia Selivanova, Energy Dual Pricing in the wto: Analysis and Prospects in the Context of 
Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization (Cameron May, London, 2008) 100.
90 Selivanova, op.cit. note 69, 291–292; Yulia Selivanova, The wto and Energy: wto Rules and 
Agreements of Relevance to the Energy Sector (International Centre for Trade and Sustain-
able Development, Geneva, 2007) 19.
91 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 289; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “gatt Law on State Trading Enter-
prises: Critical Evaluation of Article xvii and Proposals for Reform” in Thomas Cottier 
and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1998) 80 and 92–93.
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definition to apply, some level of facilitating State action is needed in order for 
a natural monopoly situation to fall under Article xvii gatt.92
It should be highlighted that Gazprom was explicitly notified to be a State 
trading enterprise by Russia during its wto membership negotiations.93 The 
company exercises control over the gas pipeline network and major processing 
plants, as well as negotiating and administering bilateral contracts for the sup-
ply of gas to Europe. Furthermore, it has had a legal monopoly on gas exports 
from Russia since June 2006. This suggests that all these activities correspond 
to the notion of “exclusive or special rights or privileges”,94 as by doing so Gaz-
prom can indeed influence exports by its selling activities.95 The Nord Stream 2 
pipeline itself, however, is being built and run by Nord Stream 2 AG, a public 
limited company incorporated under Swiss law; but seeing that it is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Gazprom, it is simply an extension of the latter as a State 
trading enterprise and should also be considered as such. This would mean 
that both Gazprom as well as its subsidiary Nord Stream 2 AG are covered by 
Article xvii gatt.
Yet that is not sufficient to guarantee the unbundling requirement under 
this provision. There are two factors limiting the effectiveness of Article xvii 
gatt regarding unbundling requirements in the context of Nord Stream 2: 
first, neither of the the substantive obligations in Article xvii.1(b) gatt – 
 providing, inter alia, that State trading enterprises are to make sales of exports 
solely in accordance with ‘commercial considerations’ and afford ‘adequate 
opportunity’ to compete for participation in sales – constitutes a self-standing 
obligation.96 This was also clarified by the Appellate Body in Canada – Wheat 
Exports and Grain Imports, wherein it stated that the main obligation on State 
trading enterprises is contained in Article xvii.1(a) gatt, obliging them to 
act in a manner consistent with the “general principles of non-discriminatory 
treatment” prescribed in the gatt. Subparagraph (b) hence merely clarifies 
92 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 290.
93 wto, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the 
World Trade Organization, WT/ACC/RUS/70 (17 November 2011) para 88. See also Peter 
Naray, Russia and the World Trade Organization (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001) 125.
94 Vitaliy Pogoretskyy, “Energy Dual Pricing in International Trade: Subsidies and Anti-
Dumping Perspectives” in Yulia Selivanova (ed.), Regulation of Energy in International 
Trade Law: wto, nafta, and Energy Charter (Kluwer, Aalphen aan den Rjin, 2011) 195, fn. 
63. See also Lars Petter Lunden, Daniel Fjaertoft, Indra Overland, and Alesia Prachakova, 
“Gazprom vs. other Russian Gas Producers: The Evolution of the Russian Gas Sector”, 
61(10) Energy Policy (2013), 663–670.
95 See also Naray, op.cit. note 93, 125.
96 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 291.
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the scope of subparagraph (a).97 This means that, in practice, if Gazprom of-
fers to sell gas at an unreasonable price, thereby effectively foreclosing access 
to the Nord Stream 2 transmission network, this opportunity to compete can-
not be regarded as ‘inadequate’, nor does Gazprom fail to act ‘commercially’ 
in a broad sense, thus giving rise to a violation of Article xvii.1(b) gatt.98 In 
fact, the language of subparagraph (b) cannot be construed “as imposing com-
prehensive competition-law-type obligations on [State trading enterprises]”99 
and has therefore to be interpreted rather narrowly,100 which would prevent 
its application as an unbundling requirement to Nord Stream 2. And second, 
the reference to the “general principles of non-discriminatory treatment” in 
Article xvii.1(a) gatt is to be understood to the effect that a State trading en-
terprise must act in a manner consistent with these general principles only in 
“its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports”. When considering 
the ordinary meaning of this phrase, it becomes clear that there is no obliga-
tion on Gazprom to actually export energy products and that only if it decides 
to trade in foreign goods must it respect these general principles mentioned in 
Article xvii gatt. Hence, even if a vertically integrated energy company such 
as Gazprom qualifies as a State trading company within the meaning of this 
provision, it is not required to grant any particular form of access to the gas 
transmission networks it controls.101
In conclusion, any obstacles encountered by the cross-border trade in energy 
goods, such as vertical foreclosure of transmission networks like Nord Stream 2, 
fall out of the scope of the gatt,102 and do not require unbundling.103 Article 
xvii gatt can therefore not guarantee the unbundling requirements within 
the context of Nord Stream 2.
3.2.2 Applicability of the gats
Some aspects of gas transportation required for transit may also be regulated 
by the gats, which could therefore allow for third-party access to and unbun-
dling of the Nord Stream 2 system (even though it should be mentioned that 
the gats – like the gatt – remains equally silent on these requirements). Its 
97 Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, Report 
of the Appellate Body of 30 August 2004, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras 100 and 106.
98 Selivanova, op.cit. note 69, 292; Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 291.
99 Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, op.cit. note 97, para 145.
100 Selivanova, op.cit. note 69, 292.
101 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 291–292.
102 wto, Council for Trade in Services, Energy Services – Background Note by the Secretariat 
of 9 September 1998, S/C/W/52, para 37.
103 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 192.
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scope is broadly defined in Article i.1 by establishing that it “applies to mea-
sures by Members affecting trade in services”,104 thus also – in principle – 
 covering trade in energy. However, as will be seen below, the gats suffers from 
significant limitations as far as the third-party access and unbundling require-
ments are concerned.
To begin with, adoption of the gats has not automatically led to legal and 
comprehensive liberalization of the energy services market. The reason for 
this is mainly the peculiar structure of the gats, under which key obligations 
such as market access only apply if and to the extent that the respective wto 
member has undertaken specific commitments in its specific schedule of com-
mitments. Concerning the energy sector, wto members have principally been 
highly reluctant to make such commitments.105 Russia only undertook rela-
tively modest commitments under the gats with respect to energy services 
and did not include trade in gas services in them,106 which is also reflected in 
the ambiguous language it used, stating that it “would apply all its […] mea-
sures governing transit of goods (including energy) in conformity with gatt 
and wto provisions”,107 thus explicitly omitting the gats.
Furthermore, it seems that production and generation of electricity and gas 
do not even constitute a service within the meaning of the gats.108 In other 
words, measures relating to production and generation of energy are not cov-
ered by the gats and wto members cannot undertake specific market access 
and national treatment commitments in this part of the energy sector.109 As a 
consequence, in the absence of relevant specific commitments and autono-
mous liberalization, all segments of the gas sector of Russia as a wto member 
may be dominated by a State monopoly, and thus there would be no scope 
for international competition.110 All of these aspects undoubtedly apply to 
104 Emphasis added.
105 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 93–101 and 274.
106 See Vitaliy Pogoretskyy and Sergii Melnyk, “Russian Energy and the wto: Overview of the 
Accession Negotiations of the Russian Federation and Final Commitments” in Kaj Hobér, 
Anna Jonsson Cornell, and Leonis Polishchuck (eds.), The Uppsala Yearbook of Eurasian 
Studies: Volume I (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, London, 2016) 64.
107 See Azaria, op.cit. note 78, 32 and 35.
108 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 274–275.
109 Ibid., 275; Simonetta Zarrilli, “Multilateral Rules and Trade in Energy Goods and Services: 
The Case of Electricity” in Janusz Bielicki and Melaku Geboye Desta (eds), Electricity 
Trade in Europe – Review of the Economic and Regulatory Changes (Kluwer, The Hague, 
2004) 249–250; wto, Council for Trade in Services, Energy Services – Background Note, 
op.cit. note 102, paras 40–41.
110 Dralle, op.cit. note 29, 275.
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 Gazprom. Beyond that, the common opinion appears to be that the gats does 
not regulate vertically integrated gas producers and suppliers such as Gazprom 
via the Nord Stream 2 network,111 in particular if such a gas producer does not 
charge separately for gas shipment services. The price formulae for gas ship-
ments by Gazprom do not appear to mention transportation costs,112 which, 
eventually, makes the applicability of the gats to Nord Stream 2 even more 
implausible.
In conclusion, this means that the gats cannot guarantee third-party ac-
cess and unbundling requirements in the context of Nord Stream 2.
3.3 The Law of the Sea and Possible Indirect Application of EU Law
3.3.1 Preliminary Considerations of Territorial Jurisdiction in the Law  
of the Sea
In the previous sections, I concluded that the strict requirements of EU law – 
namely, third-party access and unbundling – cannot be guaranteed by either 
the relevant provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty or by those of the wto 
agreements in order to assure solidarity in EU energy law. The last option I ex-
amine in this paper is a possible indirect application of EU law and the Third 
Gas Directive through international law, namely the law of the sea and its 
rules on territorial jurisdiction. This might be possible because Nord Stream 2 
will run along more or less the same route as Nord Stream 1, that is, first 
through Russian territorial waters and the Russian exclusive economic zone; 
and then through the Finnish and Swedish exclusive economic zones. Lastly, 
the pipeline will then proceed through both the Danish and German exclusive 
economic zones as well as the Danish and German territorial seas, eventually 
making landfall after crossing German internal waters at Greifswald on the 
German coast.113 Moreover, no bespoke pipeline agreement was concluded for 
Nord Stream 1, which was consequently constructed by applying the relevant 
rules of the law of the sea,114 in particular Article 58(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) and the freedom to lay submarine 
111 Irina Musselli and Simonetta Zarrilli, “Oil and Gas Services: Market Liberalization and the 
Ongoing gats Negotiations”, 8(2) Journal of International Economic Law (2005), 551–581, 
at 562; Mireille Cossy, “Energy Services under the General Agreement on Trade in Servic-
es” in Yulia Selivanova (ed.), Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: wto, nafta, 
and Energy Charter (Kluwer, Aalphen aan den Rjin, 2011) 161.
112 Pogoretskyy, op.cit. note 71, 174–175.
113 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 3.
114 Azaria, op.cit. note 78, 51.
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pipelines in the exclusive economic zone, reflecting customary international 
law.115
The question is whether the same is now true for Nord Stream 2 as well, 
and why and how the law of the sea could apply to it in order to guarantee the 
requirements of unbundling and third-party access. Of course, the law of the 
sea does not in itself regulate these requirements, as they are not covered by 
the subject-matter of this legal regime. Yet perhaps a different solution may be 
possible: in line with the principle that ‘the land dominates the sea’, meaning 
that maritime rights derive from a State’s sovereignty over the land,116 it could 
therefore be argued that EU law may apply through the prism of its Member 
States’ territorial jurisdiction over their respective internal as well as territo-
rial waters and exclusive economic zones. All of the abovementioned States 
–  Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany – are EU Member States. Thus, the 
unbundling and third-party access requirements enshrined in EU law could 
apply indirectly qua the general rules of the law of the sea on maritime delimi-
tation, piggybacking on this vehicle to application at least within the waters 
of EU Member States which are all, plus the EU itself, contracting parties to 
the Convention.117 The problem with this possible solution is, however, that 
it results – in contrast to wto law – in the unilateral application of a specific 
legal regime (in this case EU law, that is, the domestic law of one of the parties 
involved) to only certain parts of the pipeline. It does not necessarily result in a 
conflict of laws, as EU law would definitely not apply to those parts of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline located in Russian waters. However, this solution – even 
though it could at least partially guarantee the requirements of EU energy law – 
would be far from ideal: legally speaking, these requirements would only cover 
certain parts of the pipeline; politically speaking, the unilateral  application of 
115 Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed.; Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1999) 161–162; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] icj Rep. 14, para 214.
116 See, e.g., Grisbadarna Case (Norway, Sweden), Arbitral Award of 23 October 1909, riaa xi, 
155, at 159; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases Germany v Denmark; Germany v Netherlands) 
[1969] icj Rep. 3, para 96; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) [1978] icj Rep. 3, 
para 86; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qa-
tar v Bahrain) [2001] icj Rep. 97, para 185; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal [2012] itlos Rep. 4, para 185. See also Bing 
Bing Jia, “The Principle of the Domination of the Land over the Sea: A Historical Perspec-
tive on the Adaptability of the Law of the Sea to New Challenges”, 57 German Yearbook of 
International Law (2014), 63–93.
117 See also Esa Paasivirta, “The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea”, 38(4) Fordham International Law Journal (2015), 1045–1071.
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EU law – albeit legally permissible – could be seen by Russia as undermining 
the effectiveness of the common project.118
In this section, I will now investigate whether EU law may apply through the 
law of the sea to Nord Stream 2 or not.
3.3.2 Applicability of EU Law in the Territorial Sea of the Member States
The argument that EU law is not applicable to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline at all 
is difficult to sustain, seeing that it will run through considerable portions of 
Danish and German territorial waters, plus a further stretch of German inter-
nal waters.119 Articles 2 and 3 unclos state that the sovereignty of the coastal 
State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters to the territorial 
sea, which can then stretch out up to 12 nautical miles from the respective 
State’s baselines. This is the case for both Denmark and Germany, which have 
extended their territorial waters to the 12 nautical mile limit.120 Furthermore, 
given the decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU (cjeu) in the Kramer and 
Poulsen cases, it is now evident that the EU’s territorial jurisdiction is congru-
ent with that of the Member States, and that accordingly, Union law applies in 
their internal waters and territorial sea.121
This means, in conclusion, that at least within the internal waters and ter-
ritorial sea of Union Member States, EU energy law – including the Third Gas 
Directive and its requirements – would apply, even to external pipelines such 
as Nord Stream 2, bringing gas to the Union’s internal gas market.122
3.3.3 Applicability of EU Law in the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf of the Member States
The application of EU energy law to those parts of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
running through the territorial and internal waters of EU Member States is a 
118 Although this reaction would be grist to the mill of the sceptics and critics of Nord Stream 2, 
as it would suggest that Russia is pursuing a geopolitical agenda in this matter and that 
the application of EU energy law, ensuring certain competition standards, would consti-
tute an obstacle to that goal.
119 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 3.
120 For Denmark, see Act No. 200 of 7 April 1999 on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea; 
for Germany, see M.Z.N. 1. 1995. los (Maritime Zone Notification) of 8 March 1995, De-
posit by the Federal Republic of Germany of charts and geographical coordinates on the 
territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea and in the North Sea, 
and Proclamation of 11 November 1994 by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
 Germany concerning the Extension of the Breadth of the German Territorial Sea.
121 Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76, and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ecr 1279; Case C-286/90 Poulsen [1992] 
ecr I-6019, paras 28–34. See also Arts. 52 teu and 355 tfeu.
122 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 4; Talus and Wüstenberg, op.cit. note 49, 143.
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good start, but it does not answer the additional question whether EU law can 
also be applied in the respective exclusive economic zones of these States. If 
the answer is in the affirmative, this would make for an even stronger case in 
favor of the solidarity requirements of the Third Gas Directive.
To begin with, it needs to be emphasized that in the exclusive economic zone, 
extending to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured, the coastal State does not enjoy territorial sov-
ereignty, but merely certain sovereign rights over economic resources located 
within it.123 This functional sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone, lim-
ited by the relevant provisions of the Convention, was also acknowledged by 
the cjeu in Aktiebolaget by reiterating that Articles 56 and 77  unclos only 
provide for the coastal State’s sovereign right to explore and exploit the natural 
resources of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. However, the 
freedom to lay submarine pipelines in the exclusive economic zone, enshrined 
in Articles 58(1) and 79(1) unclos is not a sovereign right and also open to 
other States, subject to certain conditions.124
Thus, the question is whether and how a coastal State’s law (in this case 
also EU law) can apply to pipelines constructed in its exclusive economic zone. 
Articles 60(2) and 80 unclos clearly give the coastal State exclusive jurisdic-
tion over infrastructures established in the exclusive economic zone and on 
the continental shelf, such as artificial islands and installations as well as struc-
tures for economic purposes and for exploring as well as exploiting natural 
resources, regarding customs, fiscal, health, safety, and immigration laws and 
regulations. Hence, the coastal State can indeed apply its domestic law to regu-
late their operation.125 This also includes EU law, as the cjeu has confirmed in 
two cases. In the 2002 Weber case, for instance, it held that work carried out by 
an employee on an oil platform located on the Netherlands’ section of the con-
tinental shelf was subject to the relevant rules of Union law.126 This  approach 
123 Arts. 55–58 unclos. See also Umberto Leanza and Maria Cristina Caracciolo, “The Ex-
clusive Economic Zone” in David Joseph Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, and Norman A 
Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The imli Manual on International Maritime Law – Volume I: The 
Law of the Sea (oup, Oxford, 2014) 185–186; Alexander Proelss, “Article 55” in Alexander 
Proelss (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, 
Munich, 2017) paras 15–18.
124 Case C-111/05 Aktiebolaget NN [2007] ecr I-2697, para 59.
125 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 4.
126 Case C-37/00 Weber [2002] ecr I-2013, para 31. See also Pieter Jan Kuijper, “Customary 
International Law, Decisions of International Organizations and other Techniques for En-
suring Respect for International Legal Rules in European Community Law”, in Jan Wout-
ers, André Nollkaemper, and Erika de Wet (eds.), The Europeanization of International 
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was later confirmed in the 2012 Salemink judgment, which even more force-
fully pronounced that a Member State taking advantage of the economic rights 
to prospect or exploit natural resources on the continental shelf “cannot avoid 
the application of the EU law provisions designed to ensure the freedom of 
movement of persons working” on its installations there.127
At the same time, the situation concerning pipelines running through a 
coastal State’s exclusive economic zone is less clear. One could argue that they 
are also installations and structures within the meaning of Articles 60(2) and 
80 unclos and that they are consequently also subject to the domestic law of 
the coastal State (plus EU law, if that coastal State is an EU Member State). The 
difficulty with this argument is that Articles 58(1) and 79(4) unclos plainly 
differentiate between installations and structures to which the domestic law 
of the coastal State can apply, on the one hand, and pipelines and cables to 
which a more limited domestic legal regime applies, on the other.128 As already 
mentioned above, Articles 58(1) and 79(1) unclos set forth the freedom of all 
States to lay submarine cables and pipelines in the exclusive economic zone 
and the continental shelf, respectively. These provisions need to be read in 
conjunction with Articles 56(2) and 79(2) unclos, providing that a coastal 
State in its exclusive economic zone “shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions 
of this Convention”, nor may it “impede the laying or maintenance of such ca-
bles and pipelines.” This means that the Convention offers no legal grounds on 
which an outright prohibition of laying cables or pipelines within the exclusive 
economic zone or on the continental shelf of another State could be based.129
Nevertheless, this does not leave the coastal State without any rights con-
cerning pipeline projects in their exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf. It is of course true that Articles 58(1) and 79(1) unclos provide all States 
with a right to lay pipelines and cables in the exclusive economic zone and 
on the continental shelf of the coastal State concerned, but Articles 56(1)(b)
(iii) and 79(2) unclos also require all States to protect and preserve the ma-
rine environment as well as to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from 
Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and Its Member States (tmc Asser Press, The 
Hague, 2008) 92.
127 Case C-347/10 Salemink [2012] ecli:EU:C:2012:17, para 36.
128 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 4.
129 Talus and Wüstenberg, op.cit. note 49, 143; Catherine Redgwell, “Contractual and Treaty Ar-
rangements Supporting Large European Transboundary Pipeline Projects: Can Adequate 
Human Rights and Environmental Protection Be Secured?” in Martha M  Roggenkamp, 
Lila Barrera-Hernández, Donald N Zillman, and Iñigo del Guayo (eds.), Energy Networks 
and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets (oup, Oxford, 2012) 112.
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 pipelines.130 This means that the coastal State can certainly impose obligations 
on other States that construct submarine pipelines in their exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf, at least in relation to environmental matters. And 
although, according to Article 79(2) unclos, the coastal State may nonethe-
less not impede the laying or maintenance of cables and pipelines, the cjeu 
could be distinctly sympathetic towards permitting the application of EU law 
to pipelines in the exclusive economic zone of the affected Member States. 
In the Habitats Directive case of 2005, the cjeu highlighted that the Member 
States are obliged to apply EU law beyond their territorial waters and in their 
exclusive economic zone in order to guarantee its effectiveness.131 Admittedly, 
both the cited Convention provisions and this case are concerned with pro-
tection of the marine environment, and not with requirements such as third-
party access and unbundling, but from the cjeu’s ‘effectiveness argument’ in 
environmental law,132 it is only a short step to applying the same reasoning to 
the EU’s energy regime. With reference to the argument that in order for EU 
law to be fully effective, it also needs to be applied beyond the territorial sea – a 
teleological approach the Court also pursued in the abovementioned Kramer 
case133 – one could argue that the same is true of EU energy law, so that to fail 
to apply the Gas Directive in the exclusive economic zone and on the con-
tinental shelf of the Member States would seriously undermine the uniform 
application of the EU’s liberalization program for the gas market as well as 
open up the potential for evasion of this program by market participants. The 
main element of this line of reasoning is that if EU law in general and the Third 
Gas Directive in particular did not apply to the offshore parts of Nord Stream 2 
located in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf of the 
Member States concerned, then the objectives of this directive would be con-
siderably weakened as follows: by applying EU law solely to those areas where 
the coastal State enjoys full territorial sovereignty (that is, its land territory, 
internal waters, and territorial sea), full liberalization of the EU energy mar-
ket would not be fully achievable, as major parts of the Nord Stream 2 infra-
structure would remain subject to the control of powerful market players that 
130 These provisions are complemented by the general obligation to protect and preserve 
the marine environment (Art. 192 unclos) and to take measures to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any source (Art. 194(1) unclos).
131 Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom (Habitats Directive) [2005] ecr I-9017, paras 
115–117.
132 See Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom (Habitats Directive) [2005] ecr I-9017, 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, paras 132–133.
133 Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76, and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ecr 1279.
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would thus be able to control both the pipelines and the gas supply. Moreover, 
the non-application of EU law to these parts would have the effect of creat-
ing extremely distorting incentives to build additional infrastructure in the sea 
and beyond the control of the coastal State, hence further undermining mar-
ket liberalization. Lastly, the relevant Convention provisions do not take into 
account other legitimate interests of the coastal State that could be engaged as 
a result of pipelines being constructed, for instance, broader health and safety 
concerns, security, or economic regulation.134
Possible application of EU law is also supported by considering Article 56(2) 
unclos, requiring a balancing of the interests of both the coastal State and 
other States.135 Interpretation of this provision by international courts and tri-
bunals has shown that the history and rationale of the regime of the exclusive 
economic zone arguably militates in support of accepting a shift of emphasis 
in favor of the coastal State.136 First, it should be recalled that the notion of 
‘sovereign rights’ constitutes an extract from the broader concept of ‘sover-
eignty’, and when also taking into account the functional status of the exclu-
sive economic zone, it appears to be difficult to uphold the argument that the 
coastal State cannot be seen as being somehow privileged regarding the rights 
and jurisdiction referred to in Article 56(1) unclos. The opposite view would, 
for example, render marine spatial planning in the exclusive economic zone 
unlawful, which would ignore recent developments in State practice. Marine 
spatial planning is a tool to avoid conflicts between different rights and inter-
ests of States operating in the exclusive economic zone from the outset, and 
can only be used as an extract from the coastal State’s sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction therein.137 The mere fact that Article 56 unclos in particular or 
the Convention in general remain silent on marine spatial planning as a man-
agement process138 does not imply that the process concerned is not covered 
134 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 5.
135 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v 
United Kingdom), Award of 18 March 2015, para 534; Ishrak Ahmed Siddiky, “The Interna-
tional Legal Instruments for Cross-Border Pipelines” in Kim Talus (ed.), Research Hand-
book on International Energy Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014) 311.
136 David J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1987) 75; Alexander Proelss, “Article 56” in Alexander Proelss (ed.), United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, Munich, 2017) paras 25–26.
137 Ibid., para 27.
138 Frank Maes, “The International Legal Framework for Marine Spatial Planning”, 32(5) Ma-
rine Policy (2008), 797–810, at 799.
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by the Convention provisions.139 The same could be argued in favor of the ap-
plicability of EU energy law.
Conversely, as far as the rights of other States are concerned, Article 58(1) 
unclos does not mention ‘sovereign rights’, but simply ‘freedoms’. These free-
doms refer to the regime of the high seas, but it is vital to note that Article 
87 unclos, enshrining all specific types of freedom of the high seas, can-
not be applied to the exclusive economic zone in an unmodified manner. In 
fact, Article 58(1) unclos subjects the exercise of ‘the freedoms referred to in 
Article 87 […] of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines […] to the rel-
evant provisions of this Convention.’ The exercise of the freedoms mentioned 
in Article 58(1) unclos is therefore – compared to the high seas – subjected 
to stricter limits in the exclusive economic zone.140 As a practical approach 
to resolving potential conflicts in a flexible manner, a rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of the coastal State has been suggested, a presumption which can 
only be activated if the coastal State’s behavior does not amount to an abuse 
of rights.141 Seeing that the due regard rule in Article 56(2) unclos does not 
distinguish between ‘sovereign rights’ and ‘jurisdiction’, it could accordingly 
be argued that the shift of emphasis in favor of the coastal State advocated 
here should also apply in respect of the coastal State’s jurisdiction in terms 
of Article 56(1)(b)(iii) unclos, that is, the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.142 In the present context, one should therefore not dis-
tinguish between these two categories of ‘sovereign rights’ and ‘jurisdiction’, 
as this would disregard the sui generis status of the exclusive economic zone 
as being characterized by both categories. A fortiori, the term ‘jurisdiction’ as 
codified in Article 56(1)(b)(iii) unclos should be regarded as a proxy for the 
further development and substantiation of other rights of the coastal State, as 
long as the Convention does not contain any special rules to the contrary.143 
Hence, seeing that this is not the case with respect to energy law, there is no 
reason why EU energy law should not be extended to the exclusive economic 
zone of the EU Member States concerned. In this case, the unbundling and 
139 Mathias Schubert, Maritimes Infrastrukturrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2015) 59–62.
140 Proelss, “Article 56”, op.cit. note 136, para. 28; Edward D. Brown, “The Exclusive Economic 
Zone: Criteria and Machinery for the Resolution of International Conflicts between Dif-
ferent Users of the eez”, 4(6) Maritime Policy and Management, 325–350, at 337; Maria 
Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007) 65 
et seq.
141 Proelss, “Article 56”, op.cit. note 136, para 29.
142 Alexander Proelss, “The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone in Perspective: Legal Status 
and Resolution of User Conflicts Revisited”, 26(1) Ocean Yearbook (2012), 87–112, 102 et seq.
143 Ibid., 104 et seq., Proelss, “Article 56”, op.cit. note 136, para 30.
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third-party access requirements can be guaranteed, albeit indirectly qua the 
law of the sea, in the context of Nord Stream 2.
4 Conclusion
The plan of this paper was to describe, illustrate, and examine which legal re-
gime will apply to Nord Stream 2, and whether that legal regime will be able 
to guarantee the same requirements as EU energy law to safeguard solidarity 
among the EU Member States, first and foremost third-party access and un-
bundling. This question is of extreme significance until the entry into force 
of an amendment to the Third Gas Directive, which should then ensure the 
application of EU law and these requirements to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Until then, these requirements cannot be guaranteed through either the En-
ergy Charter Treaty or the relevant wto agreements, in the shape of the gatt 
and the gats. It might be politically inappropriate to apply EU law indirectly 
through the relevant jurisdictional provisions of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, but in my view, this is – again, until an amended Gas Directive enters into 
force and thereby guarantees the application of Union law to Nord Stream 2 – 
the only way to make sure that fair competition rules are at work and that 
this pipeline project is not abused for geopolitical reasons and to undermine 
EU policy, especially in Eastern Europe and in Ukraine.144 There is no doubt 
that EU law applies in the respective internal waters and territorial seas of the 
Member States concerned, but I also think that application in the exclusive 
economic zones of other Member States is also highly probable and can be 
argued on the basis of lex lata. This would, at least, provide for a greater territo-
rial scope of application of EU law in the Baltic Sea and thus also allow for a 
higher degree of fair market competition and energy solidarity.
144 Riley, op.cit. note 35, 25.
